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Abstract
We conduct an experimental study on behavior and cognition in prisoner’s dilem-
mas with and without role-switching from the perspective of inductive game theory
(IGT). It is basic for our study that subjects have no prior knowledge about any pay-
oﬀs, even their own; they may learn them by repeated play. Without role-switching,
many subjects learned relevant payoﬀs successfully and played a dominant strategy
consistently with predictions of IGT. With role-switching, IGT makes two behav-
ioral predictions: one is a Nash equilibrium, and the other is maximization of the
sum of payoﬀs. These two alternatives were observed for many matched pairs of
subjects. We study subjects’ understandings of payoﬀs by analyzing their answers
to a questionnaire given after the experiment, and look into the relations to behav-
iors; we find that behavior is often determined by the learned payoﬀs. We present
a model of individual behavior based on the basic postulates of IGT, which allows
us to conduct various statistical hypothesis tests for the behavior data. One test
shows some statistical (history-) independence of subjects’ behavior. Our study not
only supports but also sharpens the basic postulates of IGT.
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1. Introduction
We present an experimental study on cognitive/behavioral issues in game theory from
the perspective of inductive game theory (IGT), developed in Kaneko-Matsui [14],
Kaneko-Kline [10]-[13]. Our study has three new features relative to the experimen-
tal economics tradition. The first is the introduction of the no-knowledge assumption
from IGT that a subject has no prior knowledge on payoﬀs even for himself. This leads
to a dynamics of interactions of cognition and behavior. The second is the introduction
of role-switching, i.e., a subject plays the roles of row and column players alternately.
In IGT, this has a possibility to lead to an emergence of cooperation as discussed in
[13]. The third feature is a theoretical framework for our experiment, which sharpens
IGT and is used to inform our statistical analysis. Here, focusing on these features, we
explain the backgrounds of IGT and our results.
We choose Prisoner’s dilemmas in order to provide some clear-cut contexts for our
experimental study. For each behavioral prediction from IGT, we may find some stan-
dard theory making the same or similar predictions. We are not particularly interested
in these behavioral comparisons. We study behavioral, cognitive and epistemic bases
for IGT. Consequently, we will show a lot of diﬀerent underlying structures for cogni-
tion/behavior, and will obtain also confirm some new predictions from IGT.
1.1. Theoretical Backgrounds and New Aspects of our Experiment
Since our study is based on the basic idea of IGT, we first explain it and its diﬀerences
from the standard game theory. The basic idea is that experiences are the source for a
player’s knowledge on the structure of the game. In this paper, we restrict our attention
to payoﬀs of a player.
In classical game theory since Nash [18], which we call also the ex ante game theory,
each player is presumed to be fully cognizant of the game structure. Partial knowledge
is typically expressed as uncertainty about some parameters, but this is under the
presumption of full cognizance of the entire game structure for each player. Evolutionary
game theory/learning theory avoids this presumption by assuming that each behaves
mechanically without conscious decision making.
The standard experimental game theory has been, by and large, based on the ex
ante game theory, though the literature covers a range of approaches (cf. Camerer
[4]); some follow the ex ante approach and others are more critical of it. The no-
knowledge assumption and cognitive limitations are not issues in the literature, except
for a few studies to be mentioned below; if an experimental subject is given a well
specified instruction of the game structure including payoﬀs, neither is an issue, though
inferential/computational ability may still be a problem. The main focus has been
on actual behavior versus theoretical prediction. The entanglement of behavior and
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cognition has remained outside the scope of the experimental literature.
Due to the no-knowledge assumption, it is relevant to discuss a subject’s learning of
his payoﬀs in our approach. This “learning” has a diﬀerent meaning from the learning
literature where “learning” is typically meant to be behavioral adjustments and con-
vergences to some equilibrium (cf. Camerer [4], Chap.6). In our approach, we use the
same term “learning” to mean that a subject has acquired “subjective payoﬀ values”
from his experiences, i.e., he constructs his subjective payoﬀ matrix.
Under the no-knowledge assumption, interactions between behavior and cognition
(learning) are central. Also, role-switching is one source to learn the entire game. Thus,
we focus on those interactions both in the cases with/without role-switching. Before
going deeper to the scope of IGT, we should mention experimental studies related to
ours, which will help us to see our study relative to the literature.
In our experimental design, we avoid the possibility of the subjects knowing which
rounds they are playing and when the experiment actually stops (see Section 2.1). With
this, our results are behaviorally very diﬀerent from some known results on prisoner’s
dilemmas (cf., Selten-Stoecker [23], Andreoni-Miller [1]); in those, a strong tendency
of cooperative behavior was supported by trigger-strategies. Under the no-knowledge
assumption, we have quite opposite results: We observe dominant strategy behavior
in the case without role-switching, and some cooperative behavior with role-switching,
which is supported in a diﬀerent way from trigger-strategies.
In the case without role-switching, some behavioral tendency similar to ours has
been observed by several authors. For example, Shubik [24], McCabe-Rassenti-Smith
[16], Oechssler-Schipper [19] reported some experimental studies dealing with the case
where each subject knows only his own payoﬀs but not the other’s payoﬀs. These
correspond to the behavior of subjects in late periods of our experiment. Apesteguia [2]
and Erev-Greiner [5] studied some experiment under the no-knowledge assumption for
each player’s payoﬀs and without role-switching, in which sense their study is closest
to ours. They obtained experimental results, behaviorally quite consistent with ours in
that noncooperative outcomes were observed.
Now, let us turn to the perspective of IGT1. First, two aspects of learning are:
generation of experiences, and cognitive limitations. Two informal postulates on each
aspect were given in Kaneko-Kline [10]. Since these are central in our study, we list
them here:
Postulate BH1 (Regular behavior): Each subject typically behaves following his
regular behavior pattern.
Postulate BH2 (Occasional deviations): Once in a while (more frequently in the
1The terms, exploration and exploitation, in cognitive science help to understand the roles of the
following six postulates. Postulates BH1, BH2 constitute exploration, and ID1, ID2 do exploitation.
EP1 and EP2 form bases for both.
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beginning), each person unilaterally and independently makes a trial deviation from his
regular behavior and then returns to his regular behavior.
We will formulate a model of individual behavior representing these postulates in Section
3, based on which we will conduct statistical tests on our experimental results.
The other two postulates are about cognitive limitations: Long-term memories are
the source for knowledge, and short-term memories are temporal and may disappear
from the mind of a person:
Postulate EP1 (Forgetfulness): If experiences are not frequent enough, they would
not be transformed into a long-term memory and disappear from a subject’s mind.
Postulate EP2 (Habituation): A local (short-term) memory becomes lasting as
a long-term memory in the mind of a subject by habituation, i.e., if he experiences
something frequently enough, it remains in his memory as a long-term memory.
These postulates have an implication on a subject’s learning: By BP1 and BP2, to
have new experiences would take some time, but by EP1 and EP2, they may evaporate
from his mind. Thus, it takes some or many repetitions of the game to revise his thinking
as well as his behavior; cognitive/behavioral updating is not an immediate process after
a subject’s receipt of new information.
Under the above informal postulates, Kaneko-Kline [10]-[12] made their theoretical
development of IGT. Since it is also relevant to our experimental study, we mention this
part as postulates, too. The first one is the inductive derivation of a subject’s view, and
the second states occasional revisions of his view and behavior.
Postulate ID1 (Inductive Derivation): After a subject accumulates enough long-
term experiences, he constructs his view on the game; in our experiment, he constructs
his subjective payoﬀ matrix (matrices).
Postulate ID2 (Revising Behavior): As a subject accumulates new experiences, he
may revise his view and behavior only occasionally.
These postulates together with BH1 and BH2 imply that each subject behaves fol-
lowing the same behavior pattern (including some trials/errors) for some successive
rounds, and then he may revise it as well as his view. We will introduce a concept of
temporal phase consisting of several successive rounds for which a subject keeps the
same behavior, and between two phases, he may revise his view and behavior. The revi-
sion may not be statistically visible between close phases, but we may detect diﬀerences
if we take two remote phases.
In order to study the appropriateness of the above postulates, we adopt a specific
behavioral model and apply various statistical methods. We can use the experimental
observations to study behavioral issues. To study cognitive issues, we will focus on
the subjects’ recollections about payoﬀs solicited by a questionnaire given after the
experiment. We find good supports for the above postulates by studying the behavioral
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and cognitive data in various manners. Thus, with our statistical analyses, we are able
to discuss the experiential foundations of IGT.
1.2. Experimental Design and Data
We use the three variants of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): quasi-symmetric QS1, QS2,
and twisted T, which are described in Table 1.1. Games QS1 and QS2 become symmetric
by adding 1 to each payoﬀ for the column player. Game T is obtained from QS1 by
adding 5 to the column player’s payoﬀ from ( ) Each of QS1, QS2 and T has the same
dominant strategies () as the standard PD’s, and is equivalent up to individual payoﬀ
orderings. Asymmetry and twist are introduced to avoid the possibility of subjects to
infer payoﬀs from symmetry.
The experimental design starts with the following specifications, which will be de-
scribed in a more precise manner in Section 2:
(1∗): Two matched subjects play one of QS1, QS2, and T for 50 rounds; and each
subject knows he plays a 2× 2 game but is given no information about the payoﬀs. He
receives a payoﬀ value after each round.
(2∗): A role-switching mechanism is specified before each experiment, and in each round,
it assigns each subject to the role of blue (row) player or that of green (column) player.
A subject knows this fact but has no more specification about it before each round. We
consider two types of mechanisms: No role-switching (NRS); each has a fixed role, and
Alternating role-switching (ARS); the two subjects alternate roles each round2.
Table 1.1: Quasi-Symmetric and Twisted PD’s
 
 (5,4) (2,5)
 (6,1) (3,2)
 
 (8,7) (2,8)
 (9,1) (3,2)
 
 (5,4) (2,10)
 (6,1) (3,2)
Game QS1 Game QS2 Game T
In the end of each round, a subject receives the feedback information consisting
of his role, actions taken by the subjects, and his own payoﬀ value, summarized as a
quadruple such as:
[ ( ) 10] in game T. (1.1)
That is, he was assigned to role “green”, actions ( ) were chosen and his payoﬀ is 10.
2We find some literature dealing with role-switching (cf., Weg-Smith [25], Burks-Carpenter-
Verhoogen [3], and also see Camerer [4]). In this literature, role-switching was introduced in the
ultimatum game, trust games and other variants. Role-switching is introduced to study its eﬀects
on equity/reciprocity in the one-shot situation with the assumption that the payoﬀ structures are given
to the subjects. Our aim is to give an opportunity for a subject to understand the both payoﬀs by
playing both roles (player positions) repeatedly.
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Figure 1.1: Game T with Role-Switching
Here, we give brief explanations of behavioral and cognitive data to show some
characteristics of our experimental study.
Behavioral Data: The behavioral data consist of trajectories of action pairs with
length 50 for matched subject pairs We have the 6 = 3(games) × 2(patterns of role-
switching) treatments, and 14 subject pairs for each treatment.
Fig.1.1 describes the trajectory of action pairs for 50 rounds taken by subject pair
#8 of the treatment of game T with ARS. The action pair converges to ( ) after round
10 which is an intrapersonal coordination equilibrium (ICE) given in Kaneko-Kline [13]
and will be explained in Section 3. This kind of clear-cut convergence is found only for
a few pairs in our data.
Cognitive Data: After 50 rounds, each subject is given a questionnaire soliciting
answers about his understanding of payoﬀs. For a NRS-treatment, each subject answers
4 payoﬀ values, and for ARS, each gives 8 values. The payoﬀ answers of pair #8 for
game T with ARS are given as Table 1.2, where [·] indicates “incorrectness”. Subject
1 gave all correct payoﬀs except for two unexperienced ones, but subject 2 gave quite
simplified but incorrect payoﬀs. In fact, we will find in Section 5.3 that subject 2’s
incorrectness may be interpreted as forgetting unnecessary details and their simplified
payoﬀs may still capture some behavioral criteria.
Table 1.2: Examples of Payoﬀ Answers: [·] incorrect payoﬀs
b\g  
 5 [5] 2 10 
 [3]  1 3 2
b\g  
 [1]  [1] 2 10 
 [1]  [1] [1]  [1]
1’s answers 2’s answers
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1.3. Salient Points
A small summary of salient points of our study may help the reader understand the
paper. The first is based on the introduction of role-switching. The second is the study
of interactions between cognition and behavior. The last one is ambitious in that we
facilitate foundations for statistical analyses of our experimental data by providing a
model of individual behavior.
ICE in the ARS Cases: ARS has a significant diﬀerence from NRS. By role-switching,
we anticipate some subjects could play the ICE, predicted in [13]. It suggests equilib-
rium behavior maximizing the joint-payoﬀ sum of the two subjects, which is explained
in Section 3. The ICE is ( ) in QS1, QS2, and it is ( ) in T, indicated in Tables
1.1. Indeed, some subjects pairs showed this ICE-behavior in the experimental data of
ARS. In [13], the authors allow other possibilities of having the Nash equilibrium ( ).
If these possibilities are allowed, then almost all data are in the scope of the theory (a
few outliers remain).
Interactions between Behavior and Cognition: We anticipate cognitive and be-
havioral diﬀerences between NRS and ARS. Our results show that the subjects in NRS
had a very high accuracy of recollection of the 4 payoﬀs. On the other hand, subjects
in ARS showed much worse numerical recollection results on the entire 8 payoﬀs, as
indicated in Section 1.2. We will go much further than this simple analysis, and can
discuss postulates EP1, EP2 in a meaningful manner.
Behavioral Model and Various Hypothesis Tests: We provide a model of indi-
vidual behavior based on postulates BH1, BH2, which is formulated as a stochastic
process, describing a subject’s (deterministic) behavior with stochastic disturbances
(trials/errors). Accumulations of experiences are depending upon the cognitive ability
of a subject by EP1, EP2. By postulates ID1, ID2, a subject revises (constructs) his
subjective understanding of payoﬀs only from time to time, and then revises his behav-
ior pattern. This part can be regarded as a development of IGT itself as well as its
application.
This model enables us to conduct various hypothesis tests over a subject’s behavior.
Although we assume all the postulates for each agent, there is still a room for diﬀerences
of subjects in their degrees of doing trials/errors, recalling experiences, and revising a
view and behavior. Hence, it would be natural to focus on individual behavior of each
subject rather than the aggregated one, which will be tested. We emphasize the result
of an independence test that a subject’s behavior is typically statistically independent
(in the Markov scope) of his and the other subject’s past behavior, which has the
implication that subjects’ behaviors are history-independent, unlike trigger strategies
considered in Selten-Stoecker [23] and Andreoni-Miller [1].
These three salient points indicate that our study is not only a support for IGT but
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also an advancement of it.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the experimental design, and
gives rough evaluations of experimental data. Section 3 gives a probabilistic model of
individual behavior based on IGT, and a brief summary of behavioral criteria. Sections
4 and 5 analyze the experimental and cognitive data for NRS and ARS, respectively. In
Section 6, we present hypothesis tests of stochastic independence in subjects’ behaviors.
Section 7 gives a summary, future problems, and concluding remarks.
2. Experimental Design and the Resulting Data
Our experiment, conducted in 2009, is designed to fit the no-knowledge assumption.
We describe the experimental design in Section 2.1, and provide glimpses of the data3
in Section 2.2.
2.1. Experimental Design
Treatments: As stated in Section 1.2, we use three variants, QS1, QS2 and T, of the
PD game, and two types of role-switching, NRS and ARS. A treatment  is expressed
by a vector in the set {QS1,QS2,T} × {NRS,ARS} The experiment was conducted in
the “between-subject design”, i.e., any experimental subject participated only in one
experimental run. Each treatment was divided into two sessions.
Subjects: Each treatment has 14 pairs of subjects; the total number of subjects is
6 (treatments) ×14 (pairs) ×2 (subjects) = 168. We chose 168 subjects from the un-
dergraduate students of Waseda University, a comprehensive private university having
44 212 undergraduates (01/05/’08). They were chosen from all majors, except eco-
nomics to avoid subjects familiar with economics and game theory.
Laboratory Setting: The laboratory was set to prohibit direct interactions between
the subjects: The two subjects of a pair had interactions only through the computer
system to keep anonymity.
Experimental Procedure: The subjects were assembled and given a computer based
instructional tutorial. The tutorial took 30 minutes, including an understanding test
and a small rehearsal4, where all payoﬀs were specified to be 1.
The instructions included a statement that the experiment would stop at some round
between 40 to 60. Actually, we stopped all experimental runs at the end of round 50
This method was chosen to avoid the end-game eﬀect. After the experiment, each
subject was given a questionnaire, which took about 10 minutes to complete, and the
3Experimental materials and analyzed data are available at:
http://aitakeuchi.web.fc2.com/materials/igt_experiment.html
4We use the Z-tree program by Fischbacher [7] for our experiment.
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rewards to the subjects were paid at completion. The duration of each session was about
70 minutes.
Basic Information: In the tutorial, each subject was told that he would play a 2-person
game with a fixed opponent and had 2 available actions for his choice in each round.
Also, he was told that role-switching might happen and his role would be specified in
the beginning of each round. He would notice the pattern of role-switching only during
the experimental run. His own payoﬀ values, but not those for the other subject, were
experienced in the experimental run, and they could be memorized only in his mind (no
devices for taking notes are allowed). Subjects were informed that the payoﬀ structure
would be constant over all rounds.
The information flow to each subject in each round is as follows:
→
[; { }] shown
 or  chosen
[( ) ] shown
→
− 1 → round  → + 1
In the beginning of round  two pieces of information [; { }] appear on the monitor
screen: role  (row or column player) and available actions   Then, a subject chooses
 or  within 10 seconds5. After their choices, his screen shows the feedback information,
[; ( ) ] including his role , ’s and ’s choices,  , and his own payoﬀ value. This screen lasts for 10 seconds, and the experiment goes to the next round.
For the NRS treatments, a subject is identified with the assigned role, but, for the
ARS treatments, a subject diﬀers from a role, and the one having role  at round 1 is
called subject 1.
During the experimental run, subjects were not told which round they were in.
Payoﬀs (Rewards) to Subjects: It is also stated before the experiment that the total
reward to each subject will be paid in cash. It is calculated as: (the sum of payoﬀs from
the 50 rounds)×5yen + 500yen (participation fee). Hence, in QS1, if ( ) is played for
50 rounds, the total payment for subject 1 becomes 1 750yen. (The average payment
over all the subjects was 1 484yen.)
Questionnaire: Three types questions were given to each subject: (1) payoﬀ structure;
(2) behavioral criteria (in ordinary language); and (3) free writing comments about his
and the opponent’ behavior. For (1), we asked each subject about the 8 payoﬀs. Each
answer should be given as a nonnegative integer, or a “?” in the case he cannot recall.
Before the experiment, those questions were not explained to the subjects; simply each
5 In the instruction, each subject was informed that if he fails to make a choice in a round, his payoﬀ
for that round would be 0 In this case, the payoﬀ to the other player is 5 but the subjects were not
informed of this fact. The number of failues to make choices was 23 out of 8 400 = 50× 28× 6 moves.
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Figure 2.1: Aggregated Frequencies of Action  for NRS
subject was asked to answer the questionnaire after the experiment.6.
Language Neutrality: We use the roles as the row and column players, and available
actions  and  in writing up the experimental results. In the actual laboratory setting,
we used “blue” and “green” for the two roles, and “E” and “W” (“N” and “S”) for 
and . Also, the 14 pairs of subjects for each treatment  were divided into two sessions
where the labels “E” and “W” are switched. These methods were adopted to avoid
framing eﬀects and to keep neutrality. Our experimental results do not indicate much
diﬀerence in the behaviors of subjects between those two diﬀerent sessions.
2.2. Observed Behavioral and Cognitive Data
Behavioral Data: The behavioral data for treatment  ∈ {QS1,QS2,T}×{NRS,ARS}
are:
h(b11 b12 ) · · ·  (b501b502)i pairs  = 1  14 (2.1)
That is, (b1 b2 ) means the action pair taken by subjects 1 and 2 of pair  in round 
in treatment  We stipulate that the subjects taking roles  and  at the first round are
called, respectively, 1 and 2. So, hb1  · · · b50i means the sequence of actions taken
by subject  In NRS, each takes the same role for the 50 rounds, but in ARS, subject
 takes alternating roles in hb1  · · · b50i
In Fig.2.1, the average frequencies of choices  over the 28 subjects for each round
are depicted for each of the three NRS treatments. Looking at the trajectory of QS1,
we find that actions  and  were chosen almost equally in the early rounds, and in later
6 If we give some monetary incentives to answer payoﬀs correctly after the experiment, a subject may
not state his subjective view, including make-up payoﬀs based on his partial memory and some other
sources such as an arbitrary guess. To avoid such a bias, we did not include monetary rewards for
answers. A possible drawback of this design is that the stated beliefs without monetary incentives have
higher error than ones with monetary incentives (cf. Rustrom-Wilcox [21]).
10
rounds, the frequency of playing  is getting higher to around 08. The other figures
show some diﬀerences, but their frequencies of  are getting larger in later rounds.
At the level of an individual pair, however, we will find considerable diﬀerence in
behaviors even in later rounds: We will show in Section 4.2 that the above aggregation
over subjects is not statistically legitimate based on our model of individual behavior.
Cognitive (Payoﬀ) Data: The payoﬀ question itself is the same for all the treatments,
but, in NRS and ARS, a subject received diﬀerent information. Recall that a subject
experienced (at most) 4 payoﬀs in NRS, but 8 in ARS. Table 2.1 shows the average
individual score, stating that in NRS, about 91% of subjects’ answers are correct, while
Table 2.2 shows that the corresponding number becomes about 45% in ARS.
Table 2.1; NRS: Range from 0 to 4 Table 2.2; ARS: Range from 0 to 8
QS1 QS2 T
avg 3.69 3.36 3.86
QS1 QS2 T
avg 4.19 2.89 3.64
It is diﬃcult for a subject to memorize and recall 8 payoﬀs, but much easier to
memorize only 4. This is reminiscent of Miller’s [17] “the magic number 7”, which is
the observation that 7 digits are a typical limit for short-term memorization. This will
be discussed more in Section 5.
Table 2.1 states that each subject in NRS is practically aware of his payoﬀ structure
in later rounds. Thus, in NRS, we focus our attention on behavioral results. On the
other hand, Table 2.2 shows the statistical richness of the cognitive data in ARS and the
fact that the memory limitations are having impacts in this setting. In ARS, the focus
is concentrated on the analysis of interactions between behavior and cognitive learning.
3. An IGT-Model of Individual Behavior, and Behavioral Criteria
We develop an IGT-model of individual behavior to study the experimental data both
statistically and game theoretically. It consists of a deterministic part, expressed as a
behavioral criterion, and a stochastic disturbance representing trials/errors. Section 3.1
describes this model, and Section 3.2 describes behavioral criteria.
3.1. Trials/Errors to Deterministic Behavior
A subject may revise his thought and behavior from time to time, though the timing
does not follow a clear-cut rule. In Section 2.2, we already mentioned that behavior dif-
fers between early and later rounds. To study this diﬀerence, we introduce the concept
of a temporal phase, an example of which is depicted in Fig.3.1: During each phase,
a subject is assumed to keep the behavior constant as well as his view while making
occasional trials/errors. This “temporal phase” is for an analytic purpose to compare
behavioral changes over the course of play. For example, we compare the first and last
11
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Figure 3.1: Temporal Phases
10 rounds by regarding them as temporal phases. We will show statistically that tri-
als/errors are dominant in the first phase, while deterministic behavior emerges with
the temporal phases. The arbitrariness of the choice of 10 rounds will be discussed later.
Stochastic Process for each (  ): We regard each trajectory h(b11 b12 )  (b501b502)i
in (2.1) as the realization of some stochastic process:
h(11 12 )  (501502)i (3.1)
Recall that  is a treatment and  is a pair of subjects. We assume that all stochastic
moves are based on the probability space (ΩBPr) for (  ) Each  is a random
variable defined over Ω taking value  or  i.e.,  : Ω→ { } and its realization in
the experiment is b 
For each (  ), we let the sets Ω and B be given as: Ω = ([0 1]2)50 and B is the
-algebra of Borel subsets of Ω7 The last component, Pr is a probability measure
defined over B Now, our task is to study Pr based on our experimental data and
IGT. We sometimes abbreviate the superscript of Pr by just Pr when we focus on a
particular (  )
Objective Representation of Individual Behavior by  : We require 
to be a function over the histories up to  − 1 subject to some random disturbances
i.e.,  : ([0 1]2)−1 × [0 1]2 → { } It is an objective description of an individual
behavior of subject . In the end of round − 1 subject  has the feedback information
[ ( ) ]. In our role-switching mechanisms, the role in round  is determined
by round number ; this dependence is taken care of by the subscript  of variable
 . Since payoﬀ  is determined by ( ) the dependence of his behavior upon 
7We can adopt a finite set for Ω but it should be large enough to capture our random variables. We
thank S. Turnbull for pointing an error out.
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Figure 3.2: Two Types of History-Dependence
can be regarded as dependence upon the previous actions ( ) Hence, it is enough
to consider the dependence upon the histories in ({ }2)−1 (still subject to random
disturbances). This dependence is a direct route from the past to the present choice
emphasized by the repeated games literature.
There is another route aﬀecting subjects’ behavior. As a temporal phase proceeds,
a subject may revise his subjective payoﬀ function and change his behavior accordingly.
This is the indirect route from the accumulated experiences on payoﬀs to his action
choice which is emphasized by IGT in postulates ID1 and ID2.
Decomposition of the Individual Behavior: We work directly on the random
variables in (3.1), but the IGT background is needed to interpret our statistical tests.
Based on postulates BH1 and BH2, we decompose each random variable  into a
deterministic part and a stochastic (trials/errors) part:
(a): intentional behavior or trials/errors   : Ω→ {0 1};
(b): deterministic behavior pattern  : Ω→ { };
(c): stochastic disturbance  : Ω→ { }
The variable   dictates whether he follows deterministic  or trials/errors  .
The behavior pattern  prescribes an action  or  depending upon his previous
information. The decomposition of behavior  is formulated as follows:
 () =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 () if   () = 1
 () if   () = 0.
(3.2)
If   () = 1 then subject  follows  and if   () = 0 then he follows  . An
example of  is the independent variable taking  or  with probability 12 .
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A possible scenario is as follows: In early phases, () takes value 0 more often
than 1 This is justified by the no-knowledge assumption about payoﬀs. Later, as he
learns payoﬀs, he follows the deterministic part  more often.
The above model is similar to Selten’s [22] “trembling hand” model. One diﬀerence
is that Selten allows mixed (behavioral) strategy as   but we do not. Selten’s purpose
was to describe rationalistic decision making when trials/errors vanish, while we aim to
describe a boundedly rational subject who learns his and others’ payoﬀs by trials/errors,
and revises his behavior accordingly. We do not consider a limit of this process, but
investigate the process itself with experimental data. Even though  ’s are random
variables, we do not regard them as mixed strategies in the intentional sense8.
Choices of Temporal Phases: For our statistical study, we divide the entire 50 rounds
into 5 temporal phases consisting of 10 rounds each. We will look at the suitability of
this division later. For some statistical tests, we will take a longer phase consisting of
20 rounds, because of the data size, but other tests justify this. As mentioned, each
subject’s behavior is assumed to be constant over a temporal phase. We will return to
this issue in Section 4.3.
Stochastic Independence: We refer to stochastic independence quite often: The
general form is as follows: 1  50 are independent iﬀ for  = 1  50 and
1  50 ∈ { }2
Pr((11 12 ) = (11 12)  (501 502) = (501 502)) (3.3)
=
hQ50
=1 Pr( = )
i
× Pr(1 = 1  50 = 50)
If 1  50 are all independent, the right-hand side of (3.3) is decomposed intoQ2
=1
Q50
=1 Pr( = ) In Section 6, we will conduct some independence tests with
our experimental data.
As already stated, there are two possible routes of eﬀects from previous choices
to the present one, described in Fig.3.2: The direct route is described in  , and is
formulated in the most general manner:  : ({ }2)−1 → { } The indirect route
is through a constructed view and the revision of   and is truly a focus of IGT.
It is an important benchmark to check whether  is history-independent, except for
role-dependence. We will show, using independence tests in Section 6, that the direct
route is observed only in a small degree.
8We regard the intentional use of a mixed strategy as incompatible with the basic postulates for
IGT, since it requires a player to be very intelligent in that he is consciously capable of choosing and
generating a probability.
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3.2. Behavioral Criteria
Another issue is which behavioral criteria are observed or are at least consistent with
the data. Here, we provide several criteria for NRS and ARS. We use the cognitive data
on answered payoﬀs to check these criteria in Sections 4.2 and 5.3 respectively.
(1): NRS-Treatments: We consider two history-dependent criteria and two indepen-
dent criteria.
History-Dependent Criteria: Two typical examples from the folk-theorem literature
are the Tit-for-Tat Strategy Criterion and the Trigger-Strategy Criterion. In the former,
a player mimics his opponent’s previous choice. In the latter, each sticks to some speci-
fied action, provided that the other does too, and any deviation triggers a switch to the
other action. As mentioned in Section 1.1, Selten-Stoecker [23] and Andreoni-Miller [1]
found a strong tendency of the trigger-strategy in their experiment. Our independence
tests in Section 6 deny such history-dependent behavior in our experimental design.
History-Independent Criteria: One candidate for NRS is the Dominant-Strategy
criterion (Dom), which recommends a subject to choose a dominant strategy. This is
applied to a subjective view: No subject can use this criterion in the beginning of the
experiment because of the no-knowledge assumption. According to Table 2.1, many
subjects constructed the correct payoﬀ matrix in NRS by the end of the experiment. So
Dom could recommend each to choose  in later rounds. As far as utility maximization
is required and the subjective view has a dominant strategy, Dom is, eﬀectively, the
unique history-independent criterion.
The answered payoﬀmatrices by subjects may not allow dominant strategies. Hence,
the best response (Br) to the other’s choice may be also a relevant criterion. We re-
mark that Br may look to be history dependent if we regard it as the best response to
the previous period choice. However, our results of Section 6 suggest that this type of
lagged best response is not being used by our subjects, so we can concentrate on the
history-independent version.
(2): ARS-Treatments: For these, we have also history-dependent and history-independent
behavioral criteria. We will consider the same history-dependent criteria as in NRS, but
for these treatments, we have the possibility of role-dependent behavior.
According to the low rates of correct answers in Table 2.2, a subject’s understanding
of payoﬀs may diﬀer from the objective ones. Now, let subject ’s subjective view be
denoted by  = (   bb). In our experimental context, b and b are given
as the answered payoﬀ matrices. History-dependent criteria will be considered relative
to this subjective game. Here, we consider three history-independent criteria.
The first two are Dom and the Nash Equilibrium Criterion (NE) Since we have
role-switching, Dom should be considered from each role. NE is regarded as a pair of
his decision and his prediction about the other subject’s decision, assuming that when
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the roles are switched, the same decision/prediction pair is made. These criteria are
not distinguished at the behavioral level, but may be separated with respect to the
subjective payoﬀs. We study these in Section 5.3.
When criterion Br holds for both answered payoﬀ matrices for the two roles, NE
holds, too. In Section 5.3, we refer to the NE criterion as well as Br.
We now give the decision criterion for ARS proposed by Kaneko-Kline [13]. The
following was more generally defined in [13], but here, we give a form restricted to the
present context.
ICE: A pair (∗  ∗) is an intrapersonal coordination equilibrium (ICE) iﬀ we have the
following two inequalities in :
1
2
b(∗  ∗) + 12b(∗  ∗)  12b( ∗) + 12b( ∗) (3.4)
1
2
b(∗  ∗) + 12b(∗  ∗)  12b(∗  ) + 12b(∗  )
where  6= ∗ and  6= ∗ Weaker inequalities are adopted in [13], but here we adopt
strict inequalities for simplicity. The same action, e.g., , appears twice in the right-
hand side of the first formula. The first  is under ’s own control, but the second is
under ’s. For QS1,QS2, ( ) is an ICE, and ( ) is for T.
The rationale for ICE is as follows: When each subject has had enough experiences
of each role from role-switching, subject  projects his view  onto the other subject
 and so ’s thought about ’s understanding of the game is the same as his own. The
next step is for a subject to count his payoﬀ stream, which is the average of the payoﬀs
for two roles, 12
b( ) + 12b( )9. Then, subject  thinks that if subject  takes
the same role as , he would behave in the same manner as subject . This may be
regarded as the shoe-switching metaphor : When he puts his feet into the other’s shoes,
he behaves as the other, and correspondingly, when he puts the other’s feet into his
shoes, he expects the other to behave as he does. See [13] for more considerations such
as the generality of the above argument.
The ICE can be regarded also as a behavioral criterion. When we consider this in
Section 5.3, we denote it as Utility-sum (Ut-s).
If each subject  tries to optimize his behavior in both roles  and  without shoe-
switching, we may return to Nash equilibrium. For this, shoe-switching is replaced by
’s prediction of ’s choice as fixed leading to:
1
2
b(∗  ∗) + 12b(∗  ∗)  12b( ∗) + 12b(∗  ∗) (3.5)
1
2
b(∗  ∗) + 12b(∗  ∗)  12b(∗  ∗) + 12b(∗  )
9This criterion is based on the emprical frequency (see Hu [9]).
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Since (∗  ∗) in 3.5 is a Nash equilibrium, we have an alternative rationale for NE.
Remark: An Individual Behavior vs. the Aggregated Behavior: The above
description of the model of individual behavior has an implication for the consideration
of the behavioral data. For NRS, although we have, more or less, a unique behavioral
criterion, the process leading to the criterion may vary with an individual subject with
the degrees of trials/errors, abilities of memorization, etc. Hence, it would be natural to
focus on individual data, rather than the aggregated behaviors such as Fig.2.1. This is
more imperative for ARS, since in addition to those diﬀerences, the theory has multiple
predictions. We will do some statistical tests for this issue in Sections 4.3 and 5.2.
4. An Analysis of the Experimental Data for NRS
We start our analysis of the behavioral and cognitive data for NRS with summary
statistics in Section 4.1. Then, we check the history-independent behavioral criteria
of Section 3.2 using the data for answered payoﬀs. As mentioned there, our results of
Section 6 justify ignoring the history-dependent criteria. In Section 4.3 we construct
various hypothesis tests to show that aggregation of the behavior across phases and
individuals is inappropriate.
4.1. Preliminary Look at the Data
Let us look at the action trajectory h(b11 b12 )  (b501b502)i for subject pair (  )
in terms of some summary statistics. Consider the occurrences of  for the temporal
phases from rounds 1 to 10 (1\10) and from rounds 41 to 50 (41\50) for each subject.
Columns 1) and 3) of Table 4.1 show the numbers of occurrences of  in these phases for
treatment (QS1NRS) For example, (4 5) for  = 1 in Column 1) means that subjects
1 and 2 of pair 1 played  for 4 and 5 times, respectively. For 1\10, the number of
occurrences of  (f) greater than or equal to 8 is observed only for 6 subjects out of 28;
and this becomes 21 subjects for the latter phase 41\50
Consider also the standard deviation for those phases. We stipulate that b = 1 if
it is , and b = 0 if it is  The standard deviation for subject 1 of pair  for periods
1\10 is given as s11\10 =
qP10
=1(b1 − 1 )29 and 1 =P10=1 b1 10 The possible
values for s11\10 are 53 52 48 42, 32 and 0 In the last row, sd1\10 (= avg(sd1\10)) is
the average of sd1\10 over the 28 subjects. For example, (52 53) for  = 1 in Column
1) are the standard deviations for 1 and 2 of pair 1 for phase 1\10.
Columns 2) and 4) give the standard deviations for phases 1\10 and 41\50 for each
subject. Column 5) shows that they decreased from 1\10 to 41\50 for 20 subjects and
increased only for 3 subjects. We interpret this as meaning that in phase 1\10 the
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trial/error,   dominates the behavior of subjects, while in phase 41\50, the deter-
ministic behavior,  , is getting stronger. The last column is about the hypothesis
testing of this observation, which will be discussed in Section 4.3.
Table 4.1: QS1 with NRS
1) 1\10 2) sd’s 3) 41\50 4) sd’s 5) sign: 6) 1\10:41\50
 f s1\10 f s41\50 s41\50 − s1\10 rej
1 (4, 5) (.52, .53) (6, 8) (.52, .42) (0, -) [not, not]
2 (5, 5) (.53, .53) (9, 8) (.32, .42) (-, -) [not, not]
3 (8, 5) (.42, .53) (10, 8) (0, .42) (-, -) [not, not]
4 (7, 7) (.48, .48) (10, 9) (0, .32) (-, -) [not, not]
5 (3, 8) (.48, .42) (10, 5) (0, .53) (-, +) [rej, not]
6 (3, 4) (.48, .52) (7, 9) (.48, 0) (0, -) [not, rej]
7 (9, 5) (.32, .53) (10, 8) (0, .42) (-, -) [not, not]
8 (8, 7) (.42, .48) (5, 10) (.53, 0) (+, -) [not, not]
9 (7, 8) (.48, .42) (10, 10) (0, 0) (-, -) [not, not]
10 (7, 2) (.48, .42) (9, 8) (.32, .42) (-, 0) [not, rej]
11 (6, 7) (.52, .48) (6, 7) (.52, .48) (0, 0) [not, not]
12 (8, 4) (.42, .52) (5, 10) (.53, 0) (+, -) [not, rej]
13 (6, 5) (.52, .53) (10, 10) (0, 0) (-, -) [rej, rej]
14 (3, 6) (.48, .52) (9, 9) (.32, .32) (-, -) [rej, not]
f ≥8: 6 sd1\10 = .48 f ≥8: 21 sd41\50 = .26 #{sign -}= 20 rej: 7
Table 4.2 gives a summary of those summary statistics for (QS1,NRS) (QS2NRS)
and (TNRS). It shows a smaller tendency for the convergence to  for QS2 and T than
for QS1. Row 1) shows the numbers of subjects with f ≥ 8 but if we take frequency
f ≥ 7, they are 23 16 and and 21 for QS1, QS2 and T; thus large tendencies to play
action  in 41\50 are found for QS1 and T. Row 2) gives the number of pairs having
f ≥ 8 for both subjects out of 14 pairs for each treatment. Row 6) shows that the
standard deviations decreased from 1\10 to 41\50 for 20 and 18 subjects in QS2 and T,
respectively. In sum, we find some tendencies of convergence to  as a temporal phase
goes to the last, while trials/errors still remain.
Table 42; Summary for NRS
QS1 QS2 T
1): f ≥ 8 (f ≥ 7) : 41\50 21 (23) 14 (16) 14 (21)
2): f ≥ 8 pairwise: 41\50 8 7 6
3): f ≥ 8 pairwise: 41\50 0 2 0
4): sd

1\10 .48 .49 .47
5): sd

41\50 .26 .26 .35
6): #{sd41\50−sd1\10  0} 20 20 18
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Outliers: Row 3) of Table 4.2 shows convergences to ( ) for two pairs in QS2. No
other individual subjects played  at such a high frequency in any treatment with NRS.
In Section 4.3, they cause quite diﬀerent results in the statistical test between the
individualistic vs. aggregated behaviors10.
4.2. Cognitive Aspects
Now, let us look at the behavioral results discussed in Section 4.1 from the viewpoint
of the cognitive data, i.e., answered payoﬀs. Row 1) of Table 4.3 shows the numbers
of subjects, out of 28 whose subjective payoﬀ answers had  as the dominant strategy
(Dom). The number is high, since understandings of subjective payoﬀs are quite correct
as shown in Table 2.1. Nevertheless, some did not play ; in QS1, 16 subjects played 
with frequency f ≥ 8, out of the 21 subjects with subjective payoﬀs having Dom. Table
4.1 shows that 21 subjects played  with f ≥ 8 regardless of Dom. Thus, 5 subjects
played  without having Dom.
Table 4.3; Cognitive and Behavioral Relations for NRS
QS1 QS2 T
1): #Dom 21 23 25
1a): f ≥8 (7) in 1) 16 (16) 13 (15) 12 (19)
2): #Br 25 24 26
2a): f ≥8 (7) in 2) 19 (20) 13 (15) 14 (22)
Row 2) shows the number of the subjects whose subjective payoﬀs had  as the best
response (Br) to the other’s  In QS1, 4 subjects in addition to 21 with Dom showed
Br, but such a diﬀerence is observed only in QS1.
Table 4.4: Pair 8 in (QS1NRS)
1’s answers 2’s answers #occurrences
b\g  
 ? 2
 6 3
b\g  
 ? 5
 1 2
b\g  
 0 2
 10 38
To see the diﬀerence between subjects with Dom and with Br, we look at pair 8 for
QS1: They gave the payoﬀ answers depicted in Table 44: They did not play ( ) at
all, and they answered “?” to the payoﬀ to ( ), so Dom cannot be checked, but their
answers satisfy Br. In fact, many other subjects gave numerical answers rather than
“?” to the action pairs they did not experience often. Though they played ( ) only
twice, both answered correct payoﬀs to ( ).
10We found some explanations in their answers to the questionnaire; one subject wrote that the game
looks like a prisoner’s dilemma, and the other subject wrote he followed subject 1’s behavior.
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Aggregation  vs.  Ind iv iduals
Comparison :  1 ‐ 10   vs. 41 ‐50
Independence  Tests (Section  6)
Com parison : 31 ‐ 40   vs.  41 ‐50
Under
Independence  
Assum ption
Com parison : 11 ‐ 20   vs.  41 ‐50
Com parison : 21 ‐ 30   vs.  41 ‐50
Figure 4.1: Statistical Hypothesis Tests
4.3. Various Hypothesis Tests
Here we assume that the model of individual behavior has 5 temporal phases. We test
whether individual behavior for phase 1\10 should be regarded as diﬀerent from that
for phase 41\50. We have three other comparisons; the relationships between them are
described in Fig.4.1. They rely upon the independence assumption in the sense of (3.3),
which will be tested in Section 6. We will find that behaviors for 1\10 are significantly
diﬀerent, and as the phase goes on, the diﬀerence becomes smaller. We also consider
whether the aggregation of behaviors over the subjects is appropriate or not.
We explain one statistical test in detail. The first four tests follow the binomial test
with 2 populations in statistics (cf., Lehmann [15] and Randles-Wolfe [20])11.
Comparison between phases 1\10 and 41\50: Recall that b is regarded as 1 ifb =  and b is 0 if b =  Since  and  are arbitrarily fixed in the following, we
abbreviate the superscripts   ; hb1  b10i is expressed as hb1 b10i
Now, we assume that 1 10 and 41 50 are independent and follow,
respectively, Pr( = ) = 1 for  = 1  10 and Pr( = ) = 2 for  = 41  50
We formulate the null hypothesis as follows:
H0 : 1 = 2 .
This hypothesis is tested with the data hb1 b10i and hb41 b50i
11The statistical test here, at least its purpose, is similar to the well-known method called Fisher’s
exact probability test for two groups (cf., Gibbons-Chakraborti [8]). If we apply the Fisher test to the
comparison between 1\10 and 41\50 then it should be assumed that the total number of choices of 
in both phases is fixed. This assumption prohibits the independent behavior of a subject across the two
phases.
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Under the independence assumption together with H0 (1 = 2 = ), the likeli-
hood of the observed sequences hb1 b10i and hb41 b50i is calculated as  (1−
)20−  where b = P10=1 b +P50=41 b The maximization by controlling  is at-
tained at ∗ = b20 which is the maximum likelihood estimator of 1 = 2 =  In the
following, we assume that 1 10 and 41 50 follow ∗ = b20
In order to test the null hypothesis H0 we use the following statistic 0 over Ω :
0 () =P10=1()−P50=41() for  ∈ Ω (4.1)
This is an unbiased estimator of 10(1−2 ) i.e., (0 ) = 10(1−2 ) Thus, this statistic
detects a diﬀerence between 1 and 2  Under H0, this follows the probability distribu-
tion defined as the diﬀerence between the two identical binomial distributions, and its
range is the set {−10  0  10} Using this probability distribution, we estimate the
diﬀerence between hb1 b10i and hb41 b50i is.
We calculate b :=P10=1 b−P50=41 b from hb1 b10i and hb41 b50iwhich
can be regarded as a realization of 0  We evaluate whether the event “0 = b”
(= { ∈ Ω : 0 () = b}) is “rare” or not. We collect the possible numbers  of
occurrences of  that are not more likely than the observed b. That is,
RJ = { : −10 ≤  ≤ 10 and Pr(0 = ) ≤ Pr(0 = b)} (4.2)
Then, we have the definition of rejection with significance level 005 : We reject the hy-
pothesisH0 iﬀ
P
∈ RJ Pr( = ) ≤ 005 This means that hb1 b10i hb41 b50i
occurred as a “rare” event with the level of significance 005 and being “rare” is at-
tributed to the hypothesis H0. We call the total probability
P
∈ RJ Pr( = ) the-value of hˆ1  ˆ10i and hb41 b50i.
The results for the above test for (QS1,NRS) are given in Column 6) of Table 4.1.
It gives 7 rej’s out of 28 subjects. In the other treatments (QS2NRS) and (TNRS),
we have 9 and 10 rej’s, which are summarized in Row 1) of Table 4.5. Since the
level of significance is 005 the rejection of H0 is made on a conservative base. Thus,
the rejection has a strong implication: for many subjects, the individual behavior is
significantly diﬀerent between the first phase and the last phase. These are consistent
with the previous comparisons between s1\10 and s41\50
Table 45; Behavioral Comparisons for NRS
Four Comparisons QS1 QS2 T
1): #rej: 1\10: 41\50 7 9 10
2): #rej: 11\20: 41\50 5 6 3
3): #rej: 21\30: 41\50 3 3 2
4): #rej: 31\40: 41\50 1 0 2
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Comparisons between Phases 11\20 21\30 and 31\40 with 41\50: We make a
parallel statistical test between phases 11\20 and 41\50 The numbers of rej’s are sum-
marized in Row 2) of Table 4.5, which are much smaller than those in Row 1) Parallel
comparisons are made between 21\30 31\40 and 41\50 which are given in Rows 3)
and 4) The numbers of rejections are consistently decreasing as the phase is closer to
the last 41\50. In particular, 4) means that the individual behaviors are already quite
similar between 31\40 and 41\50.
Assumption of Constant Behaviors over a Temporal Phase: Following our as-
sumption of the constant behavior over a phase, the change in behaviors should occur
only between two phases. We made this assumption for an analytic purpose. However,
we can see from Rows 3) 4) of Table 4.5 that revisions are gradually occurring during
each of those phases, but in the initial phases, revisions occurred in more visible man-
ners. It may be diﬃcult to find an adequate uniform length of a temporal phase. This
needs further considerations, but leave them as an open problem.
An Individual Behavior vs. the Aggregated Behavior: Fig.2.1 described the
aggregated behavior over the subjects for each treatment. According to the model of
individual behavior given in Section 3, it would be more natural to study an individual
behavior than the aggregated one. If, however, the aggregation does not loose anything,
we could avoid the diﬃculty caused by the small size of the available data. We formulate
the question as a simple binomial test.
Choose a treatment  . Consider the 28 trajectories of actions hb41  b50i  =
1 2 and  = 1  14Under the assumption that the random variables in h41  50i = 1 2 and  = 1  14 are independent and follow the same probability Pr( =) =  Then, the maximum likelihood estimator of  is given as the relative frequency
 =P2=1P14=1P50=41 b (28× 10) of 
Now, let a pair  and a subject  be fixed in addition to  . We formulate the null
hypothesis as follows:
H0 : 41 50 follow   i.e., Pr( = ) =  for  = 41  50
This is tested as a binomial hypothesis test with one population: We consider only the
statistic () =P50=41 () and the probability corresponding to Pr(RJ) with the
probability structure induced by Pr( = ) =  and with the level of significance
005. The method is simpler than the previous one: Since we have much larger data for
 , we do not need to consider two populations.
Having the parallel tests for phases 1\10 11\20 21\30 and 31\40 we have Table
4.6: For 1\10 the numbers of rejections are small, which means that the individual
behaviors are, more or less, the same as the aggregated behavior, since any subject has
no sources for diﬀerences for individual behaviors. For the other phases, the aggregated
data and individual data diﬀer significantly for (QS2,NRS) but not very diﬀerent for
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(QS1,NRS) and (TNRS).
Table 46; Individualistic vs. Aggregated Behavior
QS1 QS2 T
1\10 1 1 5
11\20 6 8 3
21\30 3 15 2
31\40 1 13 3
41\50 3 13 3
We may think of two diﬀerent possible sources for rejections of H0  as suggested in
Section 3: (1) diﬀerences in individual propensities with respect to the aspects described
by postulates BH1-BH2, EP1-EP2 and ID1-ID2, and (2) diﬀerences in the resulting con-
verged outcomes, i.e., more than one natural predictions. Since we have, eﬀectively, only
one prediction, i.e., the dominant strategy criterion for the NRS treatments, the rejec-
tion results for (QS1,NRS) and (TNRS) may be regarded as caused by (1). Many
rejections for (QS2,NRS) are caused by the outliers. Table 4.6 cannot be read as imply-
ing that it would be enough to think about the aggregated behavior. We will discuss
the same tests for the ARS treatment in Section 5.2.
5. Results for Games QS1, QS2 and T with ARS
High ratios of incorrect answers in Table 2.2 give us more room for analysis. In Section
5.1, we scrutinize the cognitive data on payoﬀ answers looking for some new forms of
analysis. We then connect the cognitive data to the epistemic postulates EP1 and EP2.
In Section 5.2 the analysis is parallel to that given in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, with a focus on
the eﬀects of role-switching and ICE. In Section 5.3, we consider ordinal understanding
of payoﬀs by subjects.
5.1. Analysis 1 of the Cognitive Data
There are various sources for incorrect answers to the payoﬀ questionnaire: simple
mistreatments of actions and roles, and more structural sources. We are interested in
the latter. One such source is: recall would fail for payoﬀs experienced only a few times,
or only in the beginning phase. This is related to the postulates EP1 and EP2 and it
suggests some way to proceed with our analysis.
In Fig.1.1, each of pairs ( ) ( ) occurred only once in rounds 2 3respectively.
In Table 1.2, subject 1 gave the correct answers 5 and 1 for ( ) in role  and for ( )
in , even though those rounds are far from the last round 50 He gave only incorrect
answers to unexperienced payoﬀs to ( ) and ( ) in roles  and . On the contrary,
subject 2 gave the correct answers only to ( ) for both roles.
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k:
Figure 5.1: Recall Rate () for NRS
k:
Figure 5.2: Recall rate () for ARS
This observation raises the following questions:
C1: What are the correlations between the numbers of experiences and correct answers?
C2: Do the payoﬀ answers give enough information for ordinal comparisons?
In this section, we look at C1 and we wait until Section 5.3 to answer C2.
Question C1 is considered here. Question C2 will be considered in Section 5.3.
Consider the proportion of #subjects giving correct answers relative to #subjects
having  experiences of a particular payoﬀ, which we call the recall rate. To be precise,
let (;  ) be the number of experiences, by subject  of role  and action pair
( ) and also define  (;  ) = 1 if his answer to ( ) is correct, and (;  ) = 0 otherwise. We formulate the recall rate ():
() =
P
(;)
¯¯{ : (;  ) =  and  (;  ) = 1}¯¯P
(;) |{ : (;  ) = }|
 (5.1)
where (;  ) varies over { } × { }2
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Fig.5.1 gives the three graphs depicting the recall rates for QS1 QS2 and T for
NRS, and Fig.5.2 gives the corresponding ones for ARS In Fig.5.2, () appears
quite proportional to the number  of experiences, while it takes 1 for many  in
Fig.5.1. We find, in Fig.5.2, the tendency for subjects to learn payoﬀs more correctly
as they experience payoﬀs more, which are suggestive for a more precise structure, such
as proportionality, than Postulates EP1, EP2.
5.2. Analysis of the Behavioral Data
We analyze the behavioral data for ARS in a parallel manner to Section 4, and summa-
rize the results in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, which correspond to Tables 42 and 45 We find
several new features in these tables; occurrences of an ICE, and slow payoﬀ learning,
relative to the corresponding results for NRS. We look at Tables 5.1 - 5.4 focusing on
these features.
Smaller Numbers of Choices  and Slower Convergence: We find that in ARS,
the numbers of choices  for period 41\50 in Table 511) are much smaller than those
in NRS, shown in Table 421) This has a reason; convergent cases to the ICE include
convergences to ( ) in QS1, QS2, and to ( ) in T, in addition to those to ( ).
The slow convergence is also observed by comparing between the corresponding Rows
4)-6), of Tables 5.1 and 42. Row 4) of both tables are similar, but Row 5) become quite
diﬀerent, and Row 6) show that convergence is slower in terms of standard deviations.
Table 51; Summary for ARS
QS1 QS2 T
1): f ≥ 8 (f ≥ 7): 41\50 11 (12) 7 (8) 6 (10)
2): f ≥ 8 pairwise: 41\50 3 2 2
3): f ≥ 8 (f ≥ 7): 41\50 0 (1) 9 (12) 3): cd ind. ≥ 8 (f ≥ 7) 13 (14)
30): cc pairwise (both ≥ 8) 0 3 30): cd pairwise (both ≥ 8) 6
4): sd1\10 .49 .48 .50
5): sd

41\50 .46 .34 .32
6): #{sd41\50 - sd1\10  0} 14 19 15
Counting  and  based on ( ) for (T,ARS): The focus in (T,ARS) is the ICE
( ) and indeed, we have several pairs to converge to ( ), though we have a few other
convergences to ( ) This is caused by a twist in (T,ARS) In the following, we stipulate
to count  for role  as 1 and  for role  also as 1 For NRS, a subject was identified
with a role, but for ARS, a subject takes a role alternately. We focus on the behavior
of a subject, rather than that of a role. For example, when the trajectory for phase
41\50 is given as ( )  ( ) such as in Fig.1.1, the behavior of the subject taking 
at round 41 for 41\50 is        and for the other subject, it is       
The corresponding numerals for QS1,QS2 are 0 1 0 1  0 1 but 1 1  1 1 for T.
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In Tables 5.1, Row 4)-6) for T are calculated in this manner. In Tables 5.2 and 5.3,
the calculations for T are also based on this stipulation.
The slow convergence is consistent with the slow cognitive learning discussed in
Section 5.1. According to our model of individual behavior in Section 3, in ARS, a
subject needs more time to learn the entire payoﬀs, i.e., more trials/errors remain in
later rounds, than in NRS; thus, behavioral convergence must be slow in ARS.
Each of QS1, QS2, T has still a few convergences to ( ), shown in Row 2). Rows
3) 30) show the convergences to ( ) in QS1, QS2, and ( ) in T. No subjects played
 in QS1 in the sense of f ≥ 8, but quite a few subjects played  in QS2, though only 3
pairs out of 14 went to ( ). In T, many showed the ICE behavior.
Ut-s behavior: In games QS1, QS2, ( ) maximizes the utility sum. As observed
above, it was played in QS2, but not in QS1. Game T has a twist and the utility sum
behavior becomes ( ). Row 30) for T tells that 6 pairs out of 14 show convergences (in
the sense of f ≥ 8) to ( ) including the clear-cut convergence of Fig.1.1. Counting the
actions corresponding to ( ), 13 subjects show convergences to the actions consistent
with Ut-s.
We also find some subjects showing Ut-s in QS2, but none in QS1. A high value of
the standard deviations in Row 5) for QS1 is interpreted as meaning that trials/errors
were still dominant in later rounds12.
Statistical Tests for Comparisons of Various Phases: In the parallel manner to
Section 4.3, we make statistical tests of comparisons of behavior of subjects for 1\10
11\20 31\40 vs. 41\50. The results are given in Rows 1) - 4) of Table 52 In Table
45 for NRS, the numbers changed drastically from Row 1) to the Row 2). In Table
52 this change is less drastic, which is compatible with slow convergences in subjects’
behaviors in ARS than in NRS.
Table 52; Behavioral Comparisons for ARS
QS1 QS2 T
1): #rej: 1\10: 41\50 5 7 7
2): #rej: 11\20: 41\50 3 10 5
3): #rej: 21\30: 41\50 3 2 6
4): #rej: 31\40: 41\50 2 1 2
Implications for the Choice of Temporal Phases: We find in 4) of both Tables
4.5 and 5.2 that for NRS and ARS, individual behavior including trials/errors is already
quite stationary for phases 31\40 and 41\50 As already mentioned, we test stochastic
12Some readers may think that Fehr-Schmit’s [6] theory of inequality aversion (see also Camerer [4])
could explain our experimental results. A direct application of this theory to each of the three games
suggests the (d,d) outcome. If we use the payoﬀ sum of two rounds, the result would become exclusively
the cooperative outcome. Hence, this theory is not compatible with our behavioral data.
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independence of individual behavior in Section 6. For this, we choose longer phase 31\50
to keep the data size, which is justified by the results of stationary behaviors.
These results are also suggestive for the conjecture that our results are not sensitive
for the choice of the length of a temporal phase to be 10 but this is an open problem.
An Individual Behavior vs. the Aggregated Behavior: This comparison is made
in the same way as in Section 4. Focussing on an individual behavior of a subject, we
conduct essentially the same statistics tests for (QS1,ARS) (QS2,ARS) and (T,ARS)
and each of 1\10 11\20 21\30 31\40 and 41\50 The results are summarized in Table
5.3. We interpret this table as meaning that we should look at the data for each pair of
subjects rather than the aggregated data over the subjects.
Table 53; Individualistic vs. Aggregated Behavior
QS1 QS2 T
1\10 1 3 0
11\20 7 8 6
21\30 4 5 7
31\40 3 8 7
41\50 5 11 14
Behavioral Dependence upon Roles: Table 5.4 shows the result of the hypothesis
test of dependence upon roles  and  : We divide the data from 31\50 into the odd
and even round groups. Then, we conduct a statistical test of whether these two groups
follow the same probability structure. We can see some rejection cases; the behaviors of
some subjects are dependent upon roles. We will discuss behavioral dependence upon
roles once more in Section 6.2.
Table 54; Dependence upon Roles for ARS
QS1 QS2 T
#rej: B31\50: G31\50 5 3 3
5.3. Analysis 2 of the Cognitive Data
Recall that Table 2.2 shows the low rates of correct answers about the payoﬀs. Never-
theless, we have some numbers of convergences to action  or  in QS2 and T in Table
5.1. As already suggested in Section 5.1, decision making may depend only upon ordinal
understanding of payoﬀ values. Here, we look at the payoﬀ answers from the viewpoint
of ordinal preferences. To motivate this, let us look at the two inequalities determining
an ICE for Table 1.2:
for subject 1 5 + [5]  2 + 10 and 3 + 2  2 + 10; (5.2)
for subject 2 [1] + [1]  2 + 10 and [1] + [1]  2 + 10 (5.3)
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Recall that [·] signifies a numerically incorrect answer. Many answered payoﬀs are
incorrect, but are still correct enough to have an ICE relative to the answered payoﬀs.
Let us consider how often those inequalities hold.
Table 5.5: Subjective Understanding of Behavioral Criteria
QS1 QS2 T
Ut-s Dom Br Ut-s Dom Br Ut-s Dom Br
# of 2 12 7 10 11 4 9 22 3 6
# of 1 7 7 12 6 6 7 5 9 13
# of 0 9 14 6 11 18 12 1 16 9
Avg. 1.11 .75 1.1 1 .5 .89 1.75 .54 .89
Table 5.5 summarizes the payoﬀ answers from 28 subjects for each game with ordinal
understandings of three decision criteria: Utility-sum, Dom and Br. Utility-sum is
defined for the answered payoﬀ functions in the way of (5.2) for subject 1, to which
we assign 0 1 2 the number of inequalities correct relative to the objective payoﬀs.
Dom (also Br) takes also a value from 0 1 2, since each subject answered two payoﬀ
functions, one for each role.
It is a salient point that in T, 22 subjects out of 28 have values 2 for Utility-sum,
though the numerically correct answers are about 45% stated in Table 2.2. Dom and
Br take values 2 only for 3 and 6 subjects. Hence, in T, many subjects’ understandings
are consistent with the ICE prediction, and indeed some of them played ( )
On the other hand, in QS1 and QS2, the numbers of subjects giving value 2 to Dom
and Br are higher than in T. This is compatible with Table 5.1 for QS1, QS2.
When Br takes value 2 criterion NE holds. In Table 5.5, the numbers of value 2
for Br are quite diﬀerent from those for Dom. Thus, some subjects might use the NE
criterion rather than the Dom criterion.
There are some causalities (or correlations) between payoﬀ understanding and be-
havior. Also, the above consideration of ordinal understanding suggests a refinement of
EP1 and EP2. Also, as indicated in Section 3.2, Dom and Br are behaviorally indistin-
guishable for the objective game QS1, QS2 and T. Here, we may distinguish between
them, even though behavioral observations are the same. However, a more precise
discussion is left to a future study.
6. Statistical Tests of Independent Behavior
We test statistical independence of behavior  in the temporal phase 31\50 as
suggested in Fig.4.1. We formulate the hypothesis test of stochastic independence in
Section 6.1, and present the results for NRS and ARS in Section 6.2. The results
are positive for independence, which have the game theoretical implication that the
deterministic behavior described by  are regarded as history-independent for 31\50.
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This together with the results in Sections 4 and 5 is interpreted as meaning that 
is determined by the subjective payoﬀs and some history-independent criteria.
Here, we take temporal phase 31\50 (30\50) for our consideration in order to keep
some data size. Both Tables 4.5 and 5.2 state that this is not problematic since that
the behaviors are stable in 31\50.
6.1. A Hypothesis Test of Stochastic Independence
The general notion of stochastic independence is the non-existence of any stochastic
dependences. However, even though we restrict our attention to rounds 31\50 we
have too many possibilities for such dependences, and at the same time the sizes of
experimental data are small. Hence, we restrict13 14 our independence test to Markov-
type dependence. To be more precise, we introduce a certain statistic to detect the
Markov-type conditional probability. Our general idea is to test whether a trajectory for
31\50 is less likely generated by independent variables than by Markov-type dependent
ones. Our answer is “no”.
Let triple     be fixed. Again, we abbreviate the superscripts   . We restrict
the scope of dependences to the domain of the Markov condition that 31 50
satisfy: for  = 31  50 1  −1 ∈ { }2
Pr( =  | 1 = 1 −1 = −1) = Pr( =  | −1 = −1) (6.1)
where this requires nothing if Pr(−1 = −1) = 0 Thus, (6.1) states that the proba-
bility of  taking  may depend only upon the immediately previous pair of actions.
Also, we assume that the conditional probability is constant over 31\50 : for each
 = (1 2) ∈ { }2 there is some ( | ) such that for  = 31  50
Pr( =  | −1 = ) = ( | ) (6.2)
Now, we introduce a certain statistic, , in order to evaluate this ( | ) from the
observed data hb30 b50i (the start from round 30 is due to (6.1) and (6.2)). Then we
make the null hypothesis that the trajectory is generated by the independent variables
  = 30  50 If the probability of each observed trajectory is evaluated by the
13The runs test is typically used for testing stochastic independence in the literature (see Gibbons-
Chakraborti [8]). It is about “independence” of a series of random variables, and is not applied to a
situation including another variables like ours. For example, if 1’s are independent, and 2’s follow
“Tit-for-Tat”, the runs test cannot detect the patterned behavior of the latter, while ours can.
14The restriction can be justified by the cognitive limitationsof EP1 and EP2 mentioned in Section
1.1. Since each subject has no source other than his memory to infer in which round he is playing in
the experiment, the influence from the immediately previous actions must be dominant to those from
earlier rounds.
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statistic  for ( | ) and drops below the 5% significance level, we reject the null
hypothesis.
To introduce the statistic , we partition the rounds 31\50 into the odd number
rounds  = {31  49} and the even number rounds  = {32  50} First, we define
the vectors of random variables {} and {()} : for  ∈ { }2 and  ∈ Ω
() = |{ ∈  : () = }| ; (6.3)
()() = |{ ∈  : () =  +1() = }|  (6.4)
The first is the number of the rounds having  in , and the second is that of
successive occurrences of  and . Let  be the function defined as: for two num-
bers ( ) ( ) =  if  6= 0 and ( ) = 0 otherwise. Then, we define
the statistic  = {()}∈{}2 = {(())}∈{}2  This gives the rela-
tive frequency of  conditional upon  with the stipulation that when () = 0
() = (()()()) = 0
The following lemma states that  is an almost “unbiased” estimator of ( | )
in the following sense.
Lemma 6.1. () = Pr(  0)× ( | ) for each  ∈ { }2
Proof. () takes a value from 0 1  10 When  occurs in round  ∈  the
conditional probability of having  in round + 1 is given as ( | ) by (6.2). Hence,
when () =   0 the expected value of () is  × ( | ) Hence, () =P10
=1( × ( | )) × Pr( = ) =
P10
=1 ( | )× Pr( = ) = Pr( 
0)× ( | )
Since  is stipulated to take the value 0 whenever  = 0 our statistic 
estimates ( | ) only for  with ()  0. The coeﬃcient Pr(  0) matters for
our hypothesis tests.
The partition ( ) is introduced to guarantee Lemma 6.1. The other case where
the roles of  and  are switched will be discussed later.
The null hypothesis we test is:
H0 : 30 50 are independent and follow the same probability 30\50 
i.e., Pr( = ) = 30\50 for  = 30  50.
Recall that 30\50 =
P50
=30 b21 is the maximum likelihood estimator of Pr( = )
under the assumption that 30 50 are independent and follow the same proba-
bility. The reason for the start to be round 30 will be clear presently.
Now, we consider the region in which the statistic  = ()∈{}2 takes a value.
Let  be the set of 8-dimensional integer vectors  = {( ())}∈{}2 satisfying:P
∈{}2  = 10 and () ≤  for  ∈ { }2 (6.5)
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We also define () := {(( ()))∈{}2 :  ∈ } Each () = (( ()))∈{}2
is a 4-dimensional vector, denoted by . Then, each  = ()∈{}2 ∈ () is re-
garded as a realization of the statistic  = ()∈{}2 
From the observed trajectory hb31 b50i we define the vector b = {(bb())}
b = |{ ∈  : b = }| and b() = ¯¯{ ∈  : b =  and b+1 = }¯¯  (6.6)
This b = {(bb())} is now regarded as a realization of {(())} Hence,b = {(bb())} is the observed realization of the statistic  = ()∈{}2 
The statistic = ()∈{}2 is distributed in the region centered at (())∈{}2 
Hence, if the observed b = (b) is “far from” (())∈{}2  then a rare event hap-
pened. We evaluate this “far from” by the following set:
Cn = { ∈ () :
°° − (())∈{}2°° ≥ °°b − (())∈{}2°°} (6.7)
where k·k is the Euclidean norm.
Under our hypothesis H0  we have () = Pr(  0) · 30\50 by Lemma 6.1
Now, we say that H0 is -rejected iﬀ
P
∈ Cn Pr( = ) ≤ 005 That is, if the set
Cn is a “rare” event with respect the probability measure Pr derived from trajectory
hb30  b50 i together with the null hypothesis H0  we regard it as meaning thatb = (b) is “far from” (())∈{}2  and will attribute it as caused by the null
hypothesis H0 
The calculation of the probability distribution of  is complicated. Instead of
an analytic calculation, we run the Monte Carlo simulation to obtain the probability
distribution of  approximately and P∈ Cn Pr( = )15.
We partitioned the rounds 31\50 into the odd rounds  and the even rounds  .
We consider the other test by replacing  and  with  0 = {30  48} and  0 =
{31  49} (= ) respectively. We have the above test in the same manner by the
replacements of   with  0  0 in which case -rejection becomes  0-rejection.
We say that H0 is ∨-rejected (∧-rejected) iﬀ -rejected or (and)  0-rejected The
reason to start with round 30 rather than 31 is to have  0 = {30  48}
6.2. Results of the Independence Tests
NRS Treatments: The results for the independence test for NRS is summarized
in Table 61 In (QS1,NRS) the number of rejections is 2 for “or” (0 for “&”) out
of 28 subjects. In (QS2,NRS) and (T,NRS) the numbers are 4 (1) and 3 (0). In
15We are indebted to Eizo Akiyama of University of Tsukuba for constructing a computer program
for this simulation.
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(QS1,NRS) and (T,NRS) the rejections occurred only in either - or  0-sense. Only
in (QS2,NRS) one subject shows the ∧-rejection.
These mean that the behaviors of a majority of subjects may be regarded as stochas-
tically independent, and as following history-independent behavioral criteria in 31\50.
This statistical evidence, together with Tables 4.2 and 4.3, can be taken as a result of
many subjects playing dominant strategies or at least best-response for their subjective
payoﬀ functions.
Table 61; Independence Tests for NRS
QS1 QS2 T
#rej: ∨ / ∧ 2 / 0 4 / 1 4 / 0
Avg(p-values) .58 .58 .51
Our independence results are opposite to the former experimental results such as
Selten-Stoecker [23] and Andreoni-Miller [1]. Besides the diﬀerence in the cognitive
assumptions, we made the experimental design to eliminate the end-game eﬀects, which
were important particularly for [23] and [1]. Our results are more compatible with
Shubik [24], McCabe et al. [16], Oechssler-Schipper [19], Apesteguia [2], and Erev-
Greiner [5].
However, Table 6.2 indicates high rates of rejection when we ignore role-switching
for the ARS treatments, which is discussed below.
ARS Treatments: Role-switching gave one more piece of information, i.e., role , to
each subject in addition to the previous choices of actions and payoﬀs. First, however,
ignoring this additional information , we conduct the same hypothesis test of statistical
independence as in the NRS case. Then, the results are given in Row 1) of Table 6.2.
The numbers of rejections are significantly higher than the corresponding ones in
Table 6.1. Also, the average -values in Row 10) are much lower than those in Table 6.1.
This result is quite consistent with Table 5.3. We suspect that these results are caused
by ignoring role-switching.
The trajectory shown in Fig.1.1 (pair 8, T) is a typical example for the rejection
caused by ignoring role-switching. For this pair, since 30\501 = 1121 and 30\502 =
1021 the resulting trajectory by H0 must be quite random, but the observed trajec-
tory has the alternating pattern. Hence, we have the ∧-rejection for this pair.
This suggests that we should modify the independence test formulated in Section 6.1
by taking the information about roles into account. We allow each subject’s behavior to
depend upon the roles, i.e., it is still independent and identical except the dependence
of the probability for  upon the assigned role.
Taking Role-dependence into Account: To be precise, we assume that Pr( = )
depends upon the assigned role in round  : Let  = 1 If  is odd, then subject  assigned
to role  takes action  with the probability Pr( = ) = :30\50 :=
P
∈ b10
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and if  is even and he is assigned to role , then he takes  with Pr( = ) =
:30\50 :=
P
∈ b10 We have the symmetric definition for  = 2
The null hypothesis is as follows:
H:0 : for  = 130 50 are independent and following the same probability
Pr( = ) = :30\50 for odd  and Pr( = ) = :30\50 for even 
The rest is the same as in Section 6.1.
Results are summarized in Row 2) of Table 62 which are drastically lower than Row
1) and are similar to the NRS result. That is, almost all rejection cases are explained
by dependence upon roles.
Table 62; Independence Tests for ARS
QS1 QS2 T
1): #rej: ∨ / ∧ 6 / 4 4 / 2 11 / 7
10): Avg(p-values) .39 .50 .38
2): Counting Roles: #rej: ∨ / ∧ 1 / 0 5 / 1 0 / 0
20): Avg(p-values) .55 .60 .69
Consider the trajectory of Fig.1.1, again. For it, we have :30\501 = 0 :30\502 = 1
and :30\501 = 1 :30\502 = 0 from which we have Pr(()  0) = 1 but Pr( 
0) = 0 if  6= ( ) Thus,  captures completely the alternating pattern of the
trajectory. Hence, the test does not reject H:0 ; the -value for this is 1
After all, in both NRS and ARS treatments, our statistical tests deny the possibilities
of history-dependent strategies like the Tit-for-Tat strategy and the Trigger-strategy.
While this is contrary to the findings of Selten-Stoecker [23] and Andreoni-Miller [1], it is
consistent with our experimental design and the cognitive limitations of IGT expressed
in EP1 and EP2. The ARS case did, however, show some statistical evidence of history-
dependence on roles, which is also consistent with IGT.
7. Conclusions
We presented an experimental study of behavior and cognition in repeated situations
of PD games with/without role-switching from the perspective of IGT. We had 6 ex-
perimental treatments {QS1,QS2,T} × {NRS,ARS}. We obtained the behavioral data
directly from the experiments and the cognitive data from the payoﬀ questionnaire.
For NRS, the behavioral results as well as the answered payoﬀs are quite conclusive;
recall is almost perfect and behavior in the longer term is largely consistent with the
dominant strategy criterion. On the other hand, for ARS, the behavioral results are
less conclusive, and the payoﬀ answers are diverse. However, the data for ARS have
two salient features: Behavioral-wise, we found some convergences to the ICE as well as
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to the noncooperative outcomes, and cognitive-wise, recall of payoﬀs was more varied
across subjects, providing more room for analysis.
The behavioral results for NRS diﬀer from some existing results on the PD games,
such as Selten-Stoecker [23] and Andreoni-Miller [1]. In our NRS results, subjects started
trials/errors in early rounds and tended to play non-cooperative actions in later rounds.
This together with the cognitive results could be interpreted as meaning that many
subjects played dominant strategies in later rounds. It is consistent with Shubik [24],
McCabe et al. [16], Oechssler-Schipper [19], Apesteguia [2], and Erev-Greiner [5] despite
the fact that the first three assumed that each subject knew his own payoﬀ function,
while we started with the no-knowledge assumption. The cognitive assumption adopted
in [5] is the same as ours, and their results are quite consistent with ours.
For ARS, our results even diﬀer from [24], [16], [19], [2],and [5] as well as the standard
literature. The diﬀerence comes from the introduction of role-switching together with
the no-knowledge assumption. On the other hand, our results are quite consistent with
predictions in Kaneko-Kline [13].
The analysis of cognitive and learning aspects in NRS and ARS is also a contribution
of the paper. In NRS, each subject had at most 4 payoﬀs to recall, but the recall was
quite strong, which was discussed in Sections 4.1. On the contrary, in ARS, it was
diﬃcult for each subject to recall all payoﬀs, which was discussed in Section 5. This
confirmed our epistemic postulates EP1, EP2. Also, as discussed in Section 5.3, subjects
were found to tend to simplify the numerical payoﬀs into ordinal comparisons.
In Section 3, we provided the model of individual behavior based on the informal
postulates of IGT. This model together with the independence results is not only a
support but also a new development of IGT: It sharpens our two postulates BH1, BH2.
The comparisons between phases 1\10 11\20 21\30 31\40 and 41\50 show that there
is a tendency of convergence in subject’s behavior towards certain outcomes. Such
convergences are better understood by looking at our analyses of the cognitive data,
given in Sections 5.1 and 5.3.
This paper is only a start of an experimental study of behavioral and cognitive
issues from the IGT perspective. There are a lot of problems we have not touched.
For example, we may improve our analysis of payoﬀ learning, e.g., we extend the entire
duration to 60 rounds, with the payoﬀ questionnaire to be given after 20 40 rounds.
By this kind of extensions, the analyses of the cognitive issues such as those given in
Sections 5.1 and 5.3 will become richer than the present form. This suggests to consider
a cognitive model of individual learning, which is an important open problem. Another
issue is the stochastic independence discussed in Section 6: We may need more studies
such as further experiments of longer durations and also a simulation study to evaluate
how good our statistical test of independence is.
We have also various more game theoretical problems: One such problem of the
treatment of information, i.e., an information set or an information piece, and another
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one is the structural understanding of a game situation, which were originally discussed
in Kaneko-Kline [10] - [12].
To study those problems from experimental points of view must enrich the entire
IGT as a theory. This paper has paved the way, by providing a sound framework
and development of IGT for analysis of experimental data on behavior and cognitive
learning.
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